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CRITICAL RACE ACTION: QUEER LESSONS AND 
SEVEN LEGACIES FROM THE ONE AND ONLY 
PROFESSOR BELL 
FRANCISCO VALDES* 
I begin, as Professor Derrick Bell might have, with a short story 
based on personal experience related to social realities.  When the Law 
and Society Association met in Pittsburgh during the early 2000s, I was 
asked to participate in an author-meets-reader session focused on the 
Professor’s then-latest book, Ethical Ambition.1  After the session, we all 
walked over to the nice restaurant located in the refurbished central train 
station nearby, and as we approached, I went to open the door for him.  
He paused, looked at me, and said: “I remember when, as a child, I was 
prohibited from walking through these doors.  As a kid, I had to use 
another door.  I think this may be the first time I actually walk through 
them.”  His eyes, voice, and face all projected a heavy sense of personal 
experience with pain, perseverance, and only incomplete yet triumphant 
liberation.  In that moment, I was able to “get” (only part of) Derrick 
Bell’s uniqueness as an agent of social change. 
Having been born in the United States during the Jim Crow era of 
racial apartheid and white supremacy, Derrick Bell knew full well, as 
this anecdote underscores, that formally separate was never actually 
equal.2  Coming of age, he struggled shoulder to shoulder in the legal 
trenches of civil rights with Thurgood Marshall and other civil rights 
legal pioneers, helping “win” Brown v. Board of Education in the years 
following the Brown I and Brown II rulings of 1954 and 1955.3  After his 
1957 graduation from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, he 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.  Many thanks to the organizers, faculty, and 
students of Western New England University School of Law for bringing us together on 
September 28, 2012 at a lively symposium in celebration of Derrick Bell’s life and legacies, 
where this keynote talk was delivered.  All errors are mine. 
1. See DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH 
(2002). 
2.  See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992). 
3. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954); MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST 
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987). 
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entered the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Justice Department, one 
black attorney among thousands.  After two years, he departed, rather 
than comply with the government’s request that he end his NAACP 
membership.  It was at this time that he became First Assistant Counsel 
at the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund under Thurgood 
Marshall, managing about 300 Mississippi school desegregation cases.4 
With this work, he helped pry slightly open the law’s gates to allow 
some racial mobility—first in education, and later as the equality 
principle was seen to apply across the social board, across society at 
large.5  This was the vexed “progress” of formal equality, which Bell 
both helped to accomplish and later came to rue, as we will see below.6  
As an academic he was equally a scholar and teacher, as well as a dean 
and administrator.  Indeed, he famously used his positions as the first 
tenured, black professor at Harvard Law School and the first black law 
dean at the University of Oregon to practice the same kinds of anti-
subordination academic activism that his scholarship promoted.7  His life 
and career spanned, and helped to catalyze and direct, a revolutionary 
transition from formal hierarchy to formal equality in U.S. legal culture 
and well beyond. 
This little story about a casual lunch in the Pittsburgh train station 
therefore is but a small window into the complex man who became 
legendary literally in his own time.  But it underscores that he became a 
legend in great part because he compounded the basic elements of his 
and our humanity in our common work as legal scholars and educators, 
creating a uniquely powerful alchemy in which writing was action, but 
never enough in itself.  By persistent example, Bell revolutionized both 
the methods and substance of intellectual work in the legal academy in 
the United States during the second-half of the past century. 
Methodologically, he centered the tradition of storytelling as legal 
scholarship, helping to pioneer and establish the use of critical 
narrativity to produce knowledge.8  This kind of work was/is called 
 
4. In Memoriam, Derek Bell: 1930-2011, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law. 
nyu.edu/news/Derrick_Bell_Memoriam (last visited May 10, 2014). 
5. For a good critical summary of equality’s post-Brown history, see DAVID KAIRYS, 
PHILADELPHIA FREEDOM (2008). 
6. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN AND UNFULFILLED HOPES (2004); 
Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1975-1976); see also infra notes 18-37 and 
accompanying text. 
7. See In Memoriam, Derek Bell: 1930-2011, supra note 4. 
8. See Derrick Bell, After We’re Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-
Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393 (1989-1990) [hereinafter Bell, Post-Racial Epoch]. 
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irresponsible, dismissible, mere anecdote or—even worse—fabrication, 
by those who in every other arena of life are quite content to convey 
understanding through storytelling.9  But Derrick Bell persisted, firm in 
the conviction that parables are powerful for good, human reasons.  He 
defiantly denied that this historically and multiculturally proven 
methodology of human communication and understanding could not be 
applied to contemporary intellectual work in legal academia.  Much to 
our collective benefit, Bell helped secure a beachhead for nontraditional 
methods in legal education and scholarship through decades of hard 
work and personal example.10 
Substantively, he centered the role of race and, in particular, white 
supremacy, in the origination, development, and maintenance of general 
socio-economic prosperity and stability in the lands now known as the 
United States.11  His rich body of work on race and racism documents 
and demonstrates this basic point time and again.12  And, indeed, even 
today can we think of a time in the history of U.S. nation-building when 
racial hierarchy was not hotly in contest?  Certainly not in Philadelphia, 
nor Appomattox, nor Birmingham, nor Wounded Knee, nor Detroit, nor 
in the Rodney King uprising, nor in Sanford, Florida, where Trayvon 
Martin was killed by a white-identified vigilante in February of 2012 
while living out his American obsession with profiling and policing race 
at a personal, and even fatal, level.13 
As he observed in 1988—a year before the very first Critical Race 
Theory (CRT) workshop took place in Madison, Wisconsin14—while 
commenting on the then-trendy liberal revival of civic virtue, 
 
9. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-
Semitic?, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 853 (1995). 
10. See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as 
Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2025 (1993). 
11. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND THE AMERICAN LAW (1973). 
12. See In Memoriam, Derek Bell: 1930-2011, supra note 4. 
13. See Lizette Alvarez, Justice Department Investigation is Sought in Florida 
Teenager’s Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2012, at A10. 
14. See, e.g., Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory’s Cutting 
Edge: Key Movements That Performed the Theory, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY 32 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris 
eds., 2002); Kimberlé Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the 
Closing Door”, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 9 
(Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002); Richard Delgado, 
Liberal McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1505 (2009); 
Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and 
Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329 (2006-2007); Stephanie L. Phillips, The 
Convergence of the Critical Race Theory Workshop with LatCrit Theory: A History, 53 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1247 (1998-1999).  
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communitarianism, and the ideal of republican enlightenment: 
The virtuous citizen, however, can only be free to pursue his human 
essence through civic participation and through the life of the mind 
by having the luxury of material independence.  “Civic” societies in 
Athens and in early America affected this luxury in part by creating a 
subclass of humans who tended to the citizen’s needs of the flesh and 
who were thereby excluded from the realm of public dialogue . . . .  
Indeed, regardless of the epoch, any attempt to define human essence 
or to posit a notion of the common good historically has resulted in 
hierarchy, exclusion, and alienation.15 
This unrelenting substantive centering of white supremacy cost him 
dearly.  Mainstream legal culture, unaccustomed to seeing race relations 
at the center of anything, subverted his legitimacy even while squirming.  
For example, while visiting Stanford Law School in the 1980s the liberal 
administration readily acquiesced to a “shadow” constitutional class for 
Bell’s students because of their uninformed “concern” that his race-
centric approach to the legal acts constituting this nation-state somehow 
did not teach them what they needed to know.16  This act was 
immediately recognized as a scandalously, cowardly appeasement that, 
in the end, diminished only that institution—but that, in the meantime, 
also caused Derrick much angst.17 
As the sun set on the last millennium, the special alchemy of his 
intellectual work and personal experience had led him to insights and 
conclusions that stirred unprecedented controversy among minority and 
allied scholars.  In 1987, in his book, And We Are Not Saved,18 he 
introduced the idea of “whiteness” as property, which Cheryl Harris also 
proposed and then developed fully in her 1993 Harvard Law Review 
article by that name.19  Based on those insights, by the year 2001 Bell 
could state simply that: “The set of assumptions, privileges and benefits 
that accompany the status of being white can become a valuable asset 
that whites seek to protect” and upon which they bond factionally.20 
It is this intra-white racial compact to mutually maintain racial 
 
15. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 
YALE L.J. 1609, 1612 (1987-1988). 
16. See Dorothy Gilliam, An Insult to a Law Professor, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1986, at 
C3. 
17. Id. 
18. See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987). 
19. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). 
20. See Derrick Bell, Revised Opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, in WHAT 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 185, 188 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
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privilege that is at the crux of American nationhood, and always has 
been.21  This is why race is constitutional in American law and society.  
This is why inter-racial, class-based coalitions have failed to materialize 
throughout U.S. history—poor whites have a conflict of interest pivoting 
perpetually between race and class.22  For this reason, he concluded early 
on, racial justice progress can be achieved only when the interests of 
whites as a whole converge with those of blacks.23 
That same year, Bell summarized this complex foundational insight 
thusly: 
The barriers to moving beyond reliance on an out group for social 
stability are monumental in a nation where whites of widely 
divergent stations are able to make common cause through their 
unspoken pact to keep blacks on the bottom.  No other aspect of 
social functioning has retained its viability and its value to general 
stability from the very beginning of the American experience down 
to the present day.  Because of this fixation, I agree . . . that racism is 
not an anomaly, but a crucial component of liberal democracy in this 
country.  The two are historically, even inherently reinforcing.  In 
effect, the apparent anomaly is an actual symbiosis.24 
In other words, legal reform always accommodates and facilitates 
the morphing of “original” identitarian hierarchies favoring white, male 
heterosexuals.  Thus, as the new millennium prepared to dawn, Bell 
already saw all around the “most ominous evidence that we are in a 
period of racial rejection, a time when many whites can block out their 
own justified fears about the future through increasingly blatant forms of 
discrimination against blacks.”25 
But he had been tracking and denouncing the mounting polities of 
racial identity politics among whites and their elites his whole life.  He 
had seen the 1978 result in the fractured Bakke26 rulings as paradigmatic 
of this new backlashing era.  This is how Professor Bell pithily described 
the judges’ judging in overturning the affirmative action medical school 
admissions policy in that case: 
 
21. See generally DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, THE RACIAL STATE (2002). 
22. See generally Jerome M. Culp, To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. 
REV. 1637 (1998). 
23. See Derrick A. Bell Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
24. See Derrick Bell, Racism: A Major Source of Property and Wealth Inequality in 
America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1261, 1270 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
25. See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1991-1992) 
[hereinafter Bell, Racial Realism]. 
26. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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[U]tterly ignoring social questions about which race in fact has 
power and advantages and which race has been denied entry for 
centuries into academia, the Court . . . introduce[ed] an artificial and 
inappropriate parity in its reasoning[] the Court effectively made a 
choice to ignore historical patterns, to ignore contemporary statistics, 
and to ignore flexible reasoning.27 
For more than a quarter century he labored to help foment awareness and 
solidarity in the face of massive regression. 
In Bell’s critical estimation, by the 1990s the protection of white 
privilege, which he had seen so evident historically in Bakke, had 
become commonplace.  This was the case despite civil rights legal 
reforms, to the point of becoming a tragic farce, as signified to him most 
outrageously by the Clarence Thomas spectacle and result.  It was 
exactly twenty-one years and two days ago28 since the Judiciary 
Committee deadlocked on this nomination as the nation looked on, and it 
will be twenty-one years exactly in another twenty days since the full 
Senate confirmed it by the lowest vote in history—52/48.29  However, at 
that time, Bell was already observing and predicting that: 
The addition of Judge Clarence Thomas to the Court, as the 
replacement for Justice Thurgood Marshall, is likely to add deep 
insult to the continuing injury . . . . The cut is particularly unkind 
because the choice of a black like Clarence Thomas replicates the 
slave masters’ practice of elevating to overseer and other positions of 
quasi-power those slaves willing to mimic the masters’ views, carry 
out orders, and by their presence provide a perverse legitimacy to the 
oppression they aided and approved.30 
Professor Bell saw a proximate line between our shared, continuing 
work and this (ongoing) spectacle, and what it signified and portended.  
He bore a sense of personal responsibility for helping put into motion 
historic events leading up to this national perversion: formal equality.  
He was moved to public apology: 
As a veteran of a civil rights era that is now over, I regret the need to 
explain what went wrong.  Clearly we need to examine what it was 
about our reliance on racial remedies that may have prevented us 
from recognizing that these legal rights could do little more than 
 
27. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 369. 
28. As of the date of the live symposium where this talk was delivered.  See supra note 
*. 
29. See R.W. Apple Jr., Senate Confirms Thomas, 52-48, Ending Week of Bitter Battle; 
‘Time For Healing,’ Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at A1. 
30. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 370. 
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bring about the cessation of one form of discriminatory conduct that 
soon appeared in a more subtle though no less discriminatory form.  
The question is whether this examination requires us to redefine 
goals of racial equality and opportunity to which blacks have 
adhered for more than a century.  The answer, must be a resounding 
“yes.”31 
Explaining, he continued: 
 Traditional civil rights law is highly structured and founded on the 
belief that the Constitution was intended—at least after the Civil War 
Amendments—to guarantee equal rights to blacks.  The belief in 
eventual racial justice, and the litigation and legislation based on that 
belief, was always dependent on the ability of believers to remain 
faithful to their creed of racial equality, while rejecting the contrary 
message of discrimination that survived their best efforts to control 
or eliminate it.32 
. . . . 
. . . [H]istory should also trigger civil rights advocates to question the 
efficacy of equality theory.  After all, it is an undeniable fact that the 
Constitution’s Framers initially opted to protect property, including 
enslaved Africans in that category, through the Fifth Amendment.  
Those committed to racial equality also had to overlook the political 
motivations for the Civil War Amendments—self-interest 
motivations almost guaranteeing that when political needs changed, 
the protection provided the former slaves would not be enforced.33 
Analogizing this history to Bakke, Bell concluded, “the historic pattern 
and its contemporary replication require review and replacement of the 
now defunct, racial equality ideology.”34 
Ever since, as Bell also saw clearly even back then, “[l]egal 
precedents we thought permanent have been overturned, distinguished, 
or simply ignored.  All too many of the black people we sought to lift 
through law from a subordinate status to equal opportunity, are more 
deeply mired in poverty and despair than they were during the ‘Separate 
but Equal’ era.”35  This dawning of formal equality and its illusory 
“equal opportunity” is what makes this era of racial rejection so 
dangerous, alarming, destructive, and pernicious in Bell’s wary view: 
Despite our successful effort to strip the law’s endorsement from the 
 
31. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 375-76. 
32. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 376. 
33. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 376. 
34. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 377. 
35. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 374. 
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hated “Jim Crow” signs, contemporary color barriers are less visible 
but neither less real nor less oppressive.  Today, one can travel for 
thousands of miles across this country and never come across a 
public facility designated for “Colored” or “White.”  Indeed, the very 
absence of visible signs of discrimination creates an atmosphere of 
racial neutrality that encourages whites to believe that racism is a 
thing of the past. 
 Today, blacks experiencing rejection for a job, a home, a 
promotion, anguish over whether race or individual failing prompted 
their exclusion.  Either conclusion breeds frustration and eventually 
despair.36 
Thusly the Professor summarized the bittersweet results of progress, the 
fruits of formal equality, the wild journey, and the unfinished business of 
his own life and generation. 
Assessing the landscape of social injustice and the dynamics of its 
apparent intractability, Bell concluded this pithy articulation of “racial 
realism” with his most controversial bottom line: 
It is time we concede that a commitment to racial equality merely 
perpetuates our disempowerment. . . 
. . . . 
 Casting off the burden of equality ideology will lift the sights . . . .  
From this broadened perspective . . . we can better appreciate and 
cope with racial subordination . . . . [O]ur actions are not likely to 
lead to transcendent change and, despite our best efforts, may be of 
more help to the system we despise than to the victims of that 
system . . . .  Continued struggle can bring about unexpected benefits 
and gains that in themselves justify continued endeavor.  The fight in 
itself has meaning and should give us hope for the future . . . . 
. . . . 
   We must realize, as [did] our slave forbears, that the struggle for 
freedom is, at bottom, a manifestation of our humanity that survives 
and grows stronger through resistance to oppression, even if that 
oppression is never overcome.37 
To many, this stark and unexpected bottom line became a 
conundrum, a cause for confusion, despair, and perhaps paralysis: they 
found “Bell’s thesis about racism’s permanence to be so despairing that, 
on its own terms, it renders any meaningful possibility of action against 
racism totally unavailing.”38  How can it be, some still ask, that racism is 
 
36. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 374 (footnote omitted). 
37. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 377-78. 
38. George H. Taylor, Racism as “the Nation’s Crucial Sin”: Theology and Derrick 
Bell, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 269-70 (2004). 
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permanent and yet at the same time Bell insists that the struggle against 
racism remains worthwhile and valuable?  The answer lies, again, in 
Derrick Bell’s own work and personal example. 
During the years and decades that Professor Bell was formulating 
and organizing those provocative thoughts and conclusions, new cohorts 
of women, people of color, sexual minorities, and other outsiders were 
pioneering critical outsider jurisprudence, including critical race theory, 
critical race feminism, other legal feminisms, queer legal theory, Asian 
legal scholarship, Native American scholarship, clinical scholarship, and 
more too numerous to mention.39  These OutCritical or “OutCrit” genres 
of intellectual work are vibrant and rich, both severally and jointly.40  
Interestingly, however, in none of these genres do we find a similar 
claim—a claim to the permanence of patriarchy, or heterosexism, or 
systemic poverty, for example.  Even though analogies between race, 
gender, sexual orientation, and other identity constructs abound, none are 
found on this particular point within the legal literature of the United 
States.  Despite all the commotion that Derrick Bell’s “racial realism” 
has ignited, no similar lines of gender or sexual orientation “realism” 
have surfaced, as such, in any serious terms. 
But what if it did?  What would “gender realism” or “sexual 
orientation realism” look like?  What insights or responses might these 
new thoughts entail for critical theorists and academic activists?  And, 
assuming that these new thoughts make sense, how might they help 
critical outsider studies develop an expansive conception of “critical 
realism” that transcends specific identity categories to help elucidate the 
mutually-interlocking systems of privilege and subordination that help to 
link race, class, gender, sexuality, and other socio-legal identity 
categories in law and life, or in policy and society? 
In other words, does it make sense to speak of patriarchy’s 
permanence in the same, or similar, ways in which Derrick Bell spoke of 
white supremacy’s permanence?  Similarly, does it make sense to speak 
of heterosexism’s permanence along these lines?  Do the differences 
between white supremacy, patriarchy, and heterosexism beckon a project 
of critical realism that addresses all and each as part of the same legal 
regime?  Does it make sense for critical outsider jurisprudence to frame 
 
39. See generally Margaret E. Montoya & Francisco Valdes, “Latina/os” and Latina/o 
Legal Studies: A Critical and Self-Critical Review of LatCrit Theory and Legal Models of 
Knowledge Production, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 187 (2008). 
40. See generally Francisco Valdes, Bringing Society to Law: A Critically Raced 
Accounting, in EXPLORING THE SOCIO OF ‘SOCIO-LEGAL’ STUDIES 251 (Dermot Feenan ed., 
2013). 
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the target of our work as the dynamic fusion of these/other identitarian 
ideologies in the form of contemporary Euro-heteropatriarchy,41 and its 
resilience or permanence? 
These are just some of the profound pending questions prompted by 
Bell’s articulation of racial realism.  These are just some of the questions 
that still await critical outsider interrogation in the same spirit as Bell’s 
own work on racial realism.  These are the questions that I hope a next 
generation of critical outsider scholars might engage as part of the inter-
generational social justice project that Bell’s own example has put into 
motion for all of us. 
To begin this work, we might ask how Professor Bell would likely 
position himself in such a case.  Of course, we cannot know for sure.  
But, looking at the record he left behind, we can find clues that also 
show how he navigated the seeming conundrum of permanent struggle 
against permanent structures of subordination operating across 
“different” vectors of law and life, identity and society. 
For instance, applying the same gritty sense of social awareness and 
responsibility underlying racial realism, we see Bell’s response to the 
perpetuation of patriarchy in the context of the continuing struggle 
towards sex/gender justice in his local community, New York City.  An 
exchange of Letters to the Editor between him and the New York ACLU 
appearing in the pages of the New York Times during 1996 is revealing 
in various important respects. 
Involving a laser-like sense of critical realism, Bell wrote on July 
18, 1996 that: 
The opposition of the American Civil Liberties Union to an 
experimental public junior-high school for girls only reflects a rigid 
view of sex discrimination, which is not mandated by existing law. 
. . . . 
 But the proposed Harlem school for seventh-grade girls bears only 
a superficial resemblance to V.M.I. Throughout its 157-year history, 
V.M.I. excluded women from an elite institution that served as a 
gateway not only into military service, but into prestigious business 
and professional jobs. 
. . . . 
 The Harlem school will not protect a privileged class of people; it 
will address educational and social problems of black and Hispanic 
 
41. See generally Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: 
Deconstructing the Conflation of ‘Sex,’ ‘Gender,’ and ‘Sexual Orientation’ in Euro-American 
Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-
Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender and Sexual Orientation to its Origins, 8 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161 (1996). 
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girls.  The school will emphasize math and science, two subjects in 
which girls have lagged behind boys.  It will also give young girls an 
opportunity to attend school in an environment free of the sexual 
pressures that are so prevalent in inner cities. 
. . . . 
 Paradoxically, the A.C.L.U.’s position mirrors that of the 
conservative majority on the Supreme Court, which in recent years 
has implied that any law or policy that mentions race is 
constitutionally suspect.  This approach has echoes in the period after 
Reconstruction, when the Court used it to invalidate legislation 
intended to protect the former slaves. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he Court now “perks up only when it has the opportunity to 
decree that a white male has been the ‘victim’ of our effort to 
achieve greater racial equality.” 
. . . . 
 But success in court, as the long struggle for school desegregation 
proves, does not guarantee better education.  We civil-rights lawyers 
should recognize that our views on what the Constitution permits are 
not always in harmony with what poor, minority children need. 
 We need to give innovative educational initiatives a chance before 
intervening with legal actions that—even when they succeed—do no 
more than maintain a woeful status quo.42 
Two days later, the ACLU’s New York Executive Director wrote 
back: 
Derrick Bell . . . misunderstands our opposition to an all-girls junior 
high school in East Harlem. 
. . . . 
Attempts to create programs that are responsive to the needs of 
students—especially girls and racial minorities—should be 
encouraged.  Nonetheless, regardless of good intentions, school 
boards may not, as a general rule, segregate by sex or race without 
violating the Constitution and Federal and local laws. 
 Mr. Bell also misunderstands the A.C.L.U. Of course we promote 
and defend the rights of women, African-Americans, lesbians and 
gays and others.  We champion “liberal” and other causes, but we 
defend civil liberties regardless of how unpopular or “politically 
incorrect” the cause, or our clients, may be.  Remember Skokie?43 
These lengthy quotes from these relatively short and simple texts 
 
42. Derrick Bell, Et Tu, A.C.L.U.?, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1996, at A23 (citation 
omitted). 
43. Norman Siegel, A.C.L.U. Sees Unequal Education, But . . ., N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
1996, at A24. 
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reveal profound points about the larger integrity and vision of Bell’s 
work, and how he navigated the conundrum of apparent permanence in a 
sex/gender context. 
In these succinct texts, we see that, even if his work was forged in 
the crucible of race-centric scholarship, Derrick knew how to apply and 
extend the insights and lessons of that work to other domains of social 
injustice under the rule of the same masters’ law.  These two short letters 
crisply bring into sharp relief the gulfs between a capaciously conceived 
sense of “critical realism” based on the example of racial realism on the 
one hand, and other current approaches to law and policy—whether 
liberal, conservative or whatever.44  In that gulf of difference lies what 
he came to call “ethical ambition,”45 the proactive embrace of personal 
responsibility for social justice action.  This equally fierce commitment 
to theory and action against any and all systems of injustice, in personal 
terms, has now become a distinctive characteristic of the legal counter-
traditions that he helped to pioneer. 
It is a fundamental intellectual and functional subject position that 
Bell helped to carve out in the legal landscape during his lifetime, again 
by personal example, which highlighted and confirmed the need for 
critically capacious approaches to legal intellectual work more generally.  
Bell helped to pioneer a jurisprudential revolution through his own work 
in race contexts, but as we can see, he lived and acted on the principles 
of anti-subordination, criticality, and racial realism in other contexts too, 
including anti-patriarchal struggle.  As these letters only begin to 
illustrate, the power of his example is in the personal practice of critical 
realism in public, substantive, and principled terms. 
These letters from the mid-1990s effectively show a snapshot of 
Bell’s multidimensional activism and social engagement as an 
intellectual worker based in the legal academy.  Though he authored 
numerous academic articles and books, he also made time and found 
energy to speak out in public fora like writing these letters, and acting up 
in protest against all racist, sexist practices in his workplace and beyond, 
including famously the leave he took from Harvard until the Law School 
hired a woman of color.46  It was this alchemy that, in time, produced the 
living legend. 
 
44. See generally Francisco Valdes, Culture, “Kulturkampf,” and Beyond: The 
Antidiscrimination Principle Under the Jurisprudence of Backlash, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 271 (Austin Sarat ed., 2003). 
45. See BELL, supra note 1. 
46. See Fox Butterfield, Harvard Law Professor Quits Until Black Woman is Named, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 24, 1990, at A1. 
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While he wrote in greater depth and length, and in academic 
venues, about the interplay of race, sex, and gender, Bell’s forays into 
same-sex sexuality are more elusive to track down.  In this instance, two 
texts stand out in helping us to begin imagining how a queered critical 
realism—Queer Realism—might have looked to Bell.  Neither of these 
is a traditional legal text; both are short stories, underscoring again his 
commitment to knowledge-production through narrative and other non-
traditional practices.  Neither is extensive; both are strongly suggestive, 
however. 
In the first, The Entitlement,47 Bell tells a story about a new 
dysfunction suddenly sweeping black communities in the United States, 
which prevents all black people from engaging in sex without mutual 
intimacy.  This dysfunction, Sexual Entitlement Therapy or “SET,” turns 
out to be a gift, a therapeutic release from all kinds of self and mutual 
destructiveness expressed through sexual experiences.  This is how Bell 
puts it: 
[S]ex for black people is no longer a right, as many men believed.  
Nor is it an obligation, as many women had concluded . . . . It is an 
earned privilege, “the Entitlement.”  Sexual fulfillment has to be 
deserved, and is the result of loving treatment flowing in both 
directions between two people who honestly love and respect one 
another.48 
Ideally, he continues, 
[s]ex should be the reward for achieving full personhood, instead of 
a substitute for it.  Engaging in sex without honestly caring about 
one’s partner leads eventually, if not sooner, to despair, not bliss.  It 
leads to exhaustion, not exaltation; to heartache, not happiness; to 
disappointment, not deeper affection. 
. . . . 
. . . “And there’s a political component at work here . . . . only when 
our hearts are in play can our minds fully open to the needs of those 
around us and to the dangers that threaten.”49 
This first story is both explicitly and implicitly heterosexual and 
heteronormative, as the characters and their dialogue makes plain.  But 
Queer people do appear once: it turns out that black members of sexual 
minorities are affected “equally” by SET; it turns out we are all the 
same, regardless of sexual orientation.  We all deserve intimate love, 
 
47. See Derrick Bell, The Entitlement, in GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR 
AN ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME 188 (1996). 
48. Id. at 198. 
49. Id. at 201-02. 
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regardless of sexual orientation.  In this story, even if revealed only in 
passing, black Queer people are part and parcel of the imagined black 
community. 
One might critically question the normative premises or imperatives 
underlying Bell’s vision of human sexuality, but let us notice how 
clearly, in his view, the sexual is the human, and the personal is the 
political.  Bell’s lesson here is that insurgent resistance to hegemonic 
injustice crosses all identitarian bounds, both “public” and “private.”  
Critical realism applies in thought and deed to all the stuff comprising 
human society, even the Queer stuff. 
In the second text, Shadow Song,50 Bell focuses squarely on same-
sex love—both its social perils and human beauty.  In this story, a black 
lesbian former student, Gwynn, is in dialog over dinner with the 
Professor.  They spend the evening discussing Gwynn’s coming of 
age—her coming out story while she was a law student, at an event 
during which the Professor had been present, but without his ever having 
realized it—as well as her current love life with her white partner, 
Meredith.  Along the way, we get Bell’s definition of us: “an identifiable 
group suffering discrimination because of innate characteristics that 
entitle them to special protection of their basic rights.”51  Again, one 
might critically question the premises or consequences of this 
formulation, but, instead, the noteworthy point here is this: to the legal 
ear, this specific language seems to compel a recognition of suspect or 
suspect-like group status for sexual orientation akin to race, functionally 
acknowledging his recognition of an analogy between racial and sexual 
minorities.  This is not to say that facile analogies were part of Derrick 
Bell’s anti-subordination toolkit, as we next see. 
Though expressing repeatedly his respect and unconditional 
acceptance of sexual minorities, Bell, through Gwynn, provides a 
glimpse of his skepticism toward identitarian analogies: at one point, he 
has Gwynn saying of Meredith that she “can never understand what it is 
to be black in America” even if she knows what it is like to be Queer 
here.52  Beyond analogy, there is no substantial equivalence.  Though 
interconnected and mutually-reinforcing, “different” systems of 
oppression are different.  Experience with, and knowledge of, one does 
 
50. See Derrick Bell, Shadow Song, in GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN 
ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME, supra note 47. 
51. See Derrick Bell, Shadow Song, in GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN 
ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME, supra note 47, at 96-97. 
52. See Derrick Bell, Shadow Song, in GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN 
ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME, supra note 47, at 100. 
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not necessarily, nor tidily, help against another.  Oppression is both joint 
and several. 
After discussing the “scars” of racism, sexism, and heterosexism 
that afflict us as individuals, couples, families, and communities, Bell 
delivers a wry bottom line through the Professor, who says, “I’m 
certainly not saying that there’s no problem, . . . but it’s far from 
hopeless.”53  This pithy line is perhaps another, and somewhat lighter, 
way of encapsulating the essence of racial, or critical, realism: the 
concurrent and perpetual acknowledgement of gravity coupled with an 
equal urgency for principled anti-subordination action, whatever the 
scale or context, and regardless of probable or actual outcome in the 
short term. 
One might observe, somewhat correctly, that letters to the editors 
and short stories are a bit trifling in light of the enormous woes being 
tackled.  And indeed, perhaps these writings are not terribly complex or 
academic in any traditional sense.  But they also put on display what it 
means to avoid intellectual, personal, or political paralysis under 
conditions of mounting crisis, even retrenchment and regression.  We see 
in these efforts not despair but resistance, a decisive positioning of self 
in arenas beyond race and his personal or intellectual comfort zones of 
knowledge and experience.  We see Bell practice racial realism in sex, 
gender, and sexual orientation contexts.  In these and similar texts we see 
him go from racial realism to critical realism as personal praxis.  
Through this observation we can each better imagine, and more 
concretely begin, to do the same—to depart from existing comfort zones 
and practice critical realism multidimensionally. 
Many of us may have—and did—wish that Bell had integrated 
multidimensional analysis more expressly and robustly in his academic 
work back in the day.  He was criticized more than once for sticking to 
his basic talking points.54  Perhaps it was a limitation, but we all share 
personal limitation as an aspect of our common humanity.  For this 
reason, no person is expected to do it all: yet Derrick Bell, without 
doubt, did more than most.  In actions like these writings, he showed us 
both where he stood, and how we might now stand. 
The amazing thing about Derrick as exemplar is that we cannot 
claim he had advantages that we lack.  He was in our same profession, 
navigated its vexing limitations, contradictions, and dysfunctions like the 
 
53. See Derrick Bell, Shadow Song, in GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN 
ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME, supra note 47, at 97. 
54. See, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell’s Thesis of the 
Permanence of Racism and his Strategy of Confrontation, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 23 (1995). 
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rest of us, and traveled the material world amongst us.  Nonetheless, 
over a long lifetime, his was an academic profile shaped by ethical 
ambitions, always personally prepared to confront authority on behalf of 
the faces at the bottom of the well, always personally ready to continue 
the struggle against all systems of injustice despite their seeming 
permanence. 
This brief survey of Derrick Bell’s contributions to our world tells a 
tale of personal struggle against hegemonic systems of injustice based on 
race and/or other axes of identity.  Over the course of decades, his 
pioneering practices helped to craft a kind of insurgent resistance against 
multiple forms of subordination through intellectual and personal 
activism.  He put on display a kind of personal praxis showing anti-
subordination ethics on multiple planes of action.  His ideas, words, and 
actions were in continuous anti-subordination synergy. 
I have emphasized today the writings and deeds of Derrick Bell as 
our own exemplar of the ideal social justice scholar and educator in the 
hope that this partial summary and remembrance of his legacies might 
inspire each of us to do a bit better in following his admittedly giant 
footsteps.  We have no real choice: everything he diagnosed or 
prognosticated has come to pass—and even worsened beyond the once 
not-too-long-ago unthinkable—in the two decades since he composed 
the sobering, prescient thoughts recited above.  The ongoing wars on 
people of color, poor people, sexual minorities, and undocumented 
immigrants waged mainly through law and policy have intensified in the 
wake of a black family’s residence in the nation’s White House,55 and 
also have expanded with a vengeance against women and their liberty, 
against workers and their unions, and against universities as bastions of 
critical knowledge and thinking.56  The social and legal reassertion of 
white privilege, patriarchy, heterosexism, and related Eurohetero-
patriarchal ideologies through backlash lawmaking and cultural warfare 
is today better funded, better coordinated, and more established than 
when Derrick Bell was sounding his many alarms.57 
 
55. See generally Sumi Cho & Francisco Valdes, Critical Race Materialism: Theorizing 
Justice in the Wake of Global of Neoliberalism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1513 (2011) [hereinafter 
Cho & Valdes, Critical Race Materialism]. 
56. See Steven W. Bender & Francisco Valdes, At and Beyond Fifteen: Mapping 
LatCrit Theory, Community, and Praxis, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 397 (2011). 
57. See generally Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: 
Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or 
Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409 (1997-1998); Francisco 
Valdes, The Constitution of Terror: Big Lies, Backlash Jurisprudence, and the Rule of Law in 
the United States Today, 7 NEV. L.J. 973 (2006-2007). 
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Fortunately, so are we, by which I mean the diverse and 
overlapping communities of critical outsider scholars who have been 
building critical outsider jurisprudence during the past couple of decades 
as a viable alternative to business as usual.  And it is important to remind 
ourselves of our gains even as we acknowledge and oppose the setbacks.  
During these past twenty years, and for the first time in U.S. history, 
scholars like Derrick Bell and others following in his footsteps have 
collectively developed lines of inquiry in the U.S. legal academy focused 
on race, gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and other axes of identity 
used legally and socially to privilege the few and subordinate or 
marginalize the many.  Starting from the legacies established by legal 
realism and critical legal studies, these various genres of “OutCrit” legal 
studies have established networks, discourses, and agendas that help us 
each to do our part in the preservation and promotion of the early 
breakthroughs bequeathed to us by Derrick Bell and his 
contemporaries.58 
Following in Derrick Bell’s formidable footsteps, scholars 
associated with critical outsider projects now hold several basic 
convictions in common—a commonality not yet cohered before Bell’s 
work.  For instance, like Professor Bell we hold the conviction that white 
privilege is alive and well, and that racial domination is maintained 
through law and policy, whether “liberal” or “conservative.”59  As a 
result, critical and outsider scholars also believe that law and policy are 
central to the advancement or inhibition of equality based on race, 
ethnicity, and other social identities, and that the laws of every nation-
state provide both opportunities for opposition to oppression as well as 
for oppression itself.60  Finally, today’s critical outsider scholars hold the 
conviction that race, ethnicity, and other social identity markers are 
socially constructed, and thus require social recognition to operate: none 
stand alone or operate separately.  Instead, critical outsider networks 
believe that social realities and legal systems based on identity politics 
operate in mutually reinforcing ways that stratify society based on 
power, privilege, and their legalized distribution.61  Therefore, 
scholarship building on Bell’s foundational work encourages critical 
interrogation of law and society in structural, systemic, historical, and 
 
58. See generally supra notes 14 and 39 and sources cited therein (on the development 
of critical outsider jurisprudence in the U.S. legal academy since the late 1980s). 
59. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal 
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928 (2001). 
60. See, e.g., Cho & Valdes, Critical Race Materialism, supra note 55, at 1533-41. 
61. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out 
of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1991). 
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intersectional or multidimensional frames of analysis.62 
Importantly, these analyses and projects also encompass both intra-
group and inter-group issues of race, ethnicity, and similar identity 
constructs.  In addition to making sense of policy and doctrine, these 
efforts aim to spur social reforms by cultivating cross-group frameworks 
of analysis designed to produce knowledge as well as coalitional 
methods and theories.63  These approaches in turn have fueled counter-
disciplinary and internationalist emphases in critical and outsider 
projects and discourses, striving to transcend “domestic” constructions 
of race, ethnicity, and other categories of identity relevant to law and 
policy.64  Finally, critical outsider theorists building on Professor Bell’s 
breakthroughs have insisted that “class” and other categories of identity 
must be understood as interrelated and interlocking rather than as 
different or disconnected elements of legal regulation.65  Since the 
1990s, these collective investigations have demonstrated key 
complexities of race and ethnicity in terms of gender, sexuality, class, 
religion, culture, language, sexuality, imperialism, and colonialism.66 
Today, critical outsider scholars continue this expansive and 
expanding work with a nimble focus on current or emerging issues.  In 
recent years, for example, we increasingly have examined the interplay 
of poverty and globalization, and how these phenomena correlate 
transnationally to race, ethnicity, gender, and other identity categories.67  
Similarly, we have engaged arguments about “color blindness”68 and 
“post-racialism”69 that gained currency and notoriety during the 1990s 
 
62. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1996). 
63. See, e.g., Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, 
in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 379 (Francisco Valdes et 
al. eds., 2002). 
64. See, e.g., Berta Hernández-Truyol, Angela Harris & Francisco Valdes, Beyond the 
First Decade: A Forward-Looking History of LatCrit Theory, Community and Praxis, 17 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 169 (2006) [hereinafter Hernández-Truyol, Harris & Valdes, Beyond 
the First Decade]. 
65. See, e.g., Charles R.P. Pouncy, Institutional Economics and Critical Race/LatCrit 
Theory: The Need for a Critical “Raced” Economics, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (2002). 
66. See generally CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
(Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). 
67. See, e.g., Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: 
Critical Reflections on Comparative Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65 (2006); 
Tayyab Mahmud, Colonialism and Modern Constructions of Race: A Preliminary Inquiry, 53 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1219 (1999).  
68. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (1991); Lawrence III, supra note 59. 
69. See, e.g., Bell, Post-Racial Epoch, supra note 8; Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009).  
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and 2000s.  These issues, in tandem with the ongoing work of the past 
several decades spearheaded by critical pioneers like Bell, constitute a 
key part of our research agenda even today—a continuing campaign of 
resistance to backlash and regression that Professor Bell helped to create 
and guide through his own personal choices. 
Not surprisingly, key to our steady and precarious progression has 
been a careful, if imperfect, even messy, blending of personal and 
collective action.  As suggested by Derrick Bell’s own life, this blending 
has aimed to synthesize the various atomized initiatives associated with 
critical outsider scholarship and convert those efforts into programmatic, 
sustainable interventions that go beyond the atomized ways and means 
of academic work.  This work has allowed us to conceive of “collective 
personal praxis” as a continuation of the legacies left to us by the Bell 
generation.70 
Nonetheless, as the Professor emphasized in his own work, some 
things never really do change.  Whatever else may be said about the 
accomplishments and the setbacks of the recent past, the call to, and 
challenges of, personal anti-subordination action remain constant.71  
Whatever insights, experiences, and aspirations may underlie our 
ongoing commitment to personal collective praxis, the issues 
surrounding ethical ambition will likely remain key to the substantive 
integrity and social endurance of our professional labors.  Whatever else 
may be said of whatever else, the question to which each of us arises 
every day is the same: what will I do today, personally, to practice social 
justice principles in solidarity with others? 
In some crucial respects, this persisting emphasis on personal 
collective praxis and its intricacies engages a conundrum that Bell 
himself never quite resolved, as he acknowledged in Ethical Ambition.  
There, in 2002, he wrote: 
I would have loved to have had allies in some of my early challenges 
to authority, but my efforts to change grouch sessions into forums for 
planning positive action were rarely successful.  According to my co-
workers, the time or the plan or the circumstances were never right.  
At the same time they felt uncomfortable about making excuses for 
not being candid with those in authority, and I was embarrassed by 
their efforts to rationalize inaction.  After enough disappointments of 
this kind I stopped trying to organize and started speaking up or 
 
70. See Hernández-Truyol, Harris & Valdes, Beyond the First Decade, supra note 64, at 
194-99. 
71. See generally Francisco Valdes, Insisting on Critical Theory in Legal Education: 
Making do While Making Waves, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 137 (2001). 
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protesting on my own.72 
. . . . 
However, despite the conservative political climate—especially 
because of that climate—it is crucial that we challenge unjust work 
practices and health threats as a group.  It may sound naïvely 
idealistic, but it is only our ability to take action as a group that 
provides real checks and balances in a democratic society.  Group 
struggle is hard, sometimes the hardest of risks, because at any point 
the urge to leave the struggle to others can so easily justify our not 
continuing.  But it is also the most honorable, the most clearly 
selfless of all the risks, because its immediate effect on others is so 
palpable.73 
Summing up this foundational yet unresolved observation, he then 
concluded: 
[T]here have been times over the years when my efforts to live an 
ethical life have made me a poorer rather than a better colleague.  I 
try to get along with everyone and pull at least my share of the 
workload, but my strong commitment to independence sometimes 
makes it hard for me to be a team player—particularly when the 
team wants to go in a direction with which I disagree.  Sometimes 
this involves what I consider an ethical issue, but more often it is 
simply a disagreement.  When I do go along, I try hard not to 
compromise my sense of independence.74 
In these three quotes or excerpts we can see the Professor struggling 
with the question, and with the ethics, of individual versus concerted 
action. 
We observe him sometimes gravitating toward the need for “group 
struggle” even though it is “sometimes the hardest of risks” while 
struggling simultaneously to “not compromise [his] sense of 
independence.”  The commitment both to collective action and to 
individual independence frames the author’s unresolved ambivalence.  
After decades of personal, social, and intellectual struggle, a towering 
pioneer of critical outsider jurisprudence remains unsure about the path 
to take in this choice over method in praxis.  It is an uncertainty well 
known, and still reflected in, the venues and texts of scholars following 
in Bell’s footsteps, who confront similar vexations in the day-to-day 
doings of our work.  Indeed, the history of critical outsider jurisprudence 
during the past two decades or so is marked by the efforts of many 
 
72. BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 1, at 55-56. 
73. BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 1, at 70-71. 
74. BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 1, at 123. 
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pioneering scholars and activists who, like Derrick Bell, struggle to 
strike a principled balance between the imperatives of ethics and the 
dynamics of ambition.  It is a struggle that necessarily continues today.75 
And so I conclude by turning to—and cheerfully reminding us of—
the seven distillations of critical wisdom that Derrick bequeathed us 
expressly as “Legacies” for us, his posterity.  Included in another of his 
storytelling texts—Afrolantica Legacies76—these seven Legacies 
provide us all with a daily mantra to internalize and apply this very day 
as we go about our personal, professional, social and economic lives.  I 
conclude by intoning them because I hope and believe that, over time, 
they can help to sustain our flesh and spirit for the never-ending hand-to-
hand combat against hegemonic injustice, as did the one and only 
Professor Bell to the very end of this lifetime. 
This is how they go: 
I. No matter how justified by the racial [and other identity-
based social] injustices that they are intended to remedy, 
civil rights policies, including affirmative action, are 
implemented for [outgroups] only when they further 
interests of [ingroups]. 
II. Service in the cause of truth and justice is no less worthy of 
praise because it is misunderstood, misused, or condemned. 
III. Coalition building is an enterprise with valuable potential as 
long as its pursuit does not obscure the basic fact: nobody 
can free us but ourselves. 
IV. An individual whose actions against [oppression] threaten 
the powerful must be prepared to endure both the 
condemnation of enemies and the abandonment by friends. 
V. Continued resistance by the powerless eventually triumphs 
over power, and thus oppression must be resisted, even 
when opposition seems useless. 
VI. The courage to confront [subordination], while worthy of 
praise, should not obscure the fact that the powerful can 
employ our confrontative statements[/acts] to serve their 
ends as effectively as they can those deplorable self-
blaming comments by [some outgroup members]. 
VII. Life seems to favor those in power, while it seldom rewards 
triumphs with good works. The righteous must rely on their 
faith and champion justice even in a seemingly lost cause.77 
 
75. See generally supra notes 50-71 and sources cited therein (on continuing work to 
build critical outsider studies and discourse on the U.S. legal academy). 
76. DERRICK BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES (1997). 
77. Id. at xi-xii. 
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In the end, I would add and posit, these legacies are “Queer” 
lessons—if we understand Queer to mean, as it did to Queer Nation in 
the 1990s—a multidimensional, personal, and coalitional engagement in 
action against the combined yet variegated effects of systemic 
Euroheteropatriarchy.  In the end, even though Professor Bell drew his 
lessons from racial domination, he came down to the same bottom line, 
at roughly the same time, as did the Queer sexual minority activists of 
the 1990s.  The hard-gained wisdom of his actions and these legacies are 
now a shared inheritance. 
Invoking the Queer sensibilities of these seven Legacies, I hope to 
have provided some encouragement to the inclinations within each of us 
to follow in Derrick Bell’s footsteps, to the best of our abilities, and in 
light of our own frailties, limitations, or other circumstances.  The very 
fact that we are all and each here today,78 to celebrate his remarkable 
work and example, shows we have something to build.  Nevertheless, the 
difficulty, oftentimes, seems to be: how do we individually carry on, 
after we disperse and return to our atomized lives, under the wearing 
grind of hegemonic injustice?  How do we sustain the daily energy and 
courage to mount insurgent resistance to an implacable and 
multidimensionally deranged status quo?  How do we cope, day in and 
day out, with the micro-and-macro aggressions that kill both bodies and 
spirits, while marching out each day resolutely to battle against 
intentionally blinded regimes of permanent neocolonial oppressions? 
Bell’s personal and intellectual life shows that no panacea exists for 
these existential queries.  But his unflagging lifelong commitment to 
permanent resistance as a personal, everyday, multidimensional practice 
in myriad situations does provide a case study for the ages in how to 
engage them concretely.  Returning time and again to Derrick Bell’s 
biography and body of work provides manifold lessons, insights, and 
techniques for coping ethically with the bottom lines of critical realism 
for a lifetime of academic and social activism.  And concluding with his 
seven self-styled Legacies provides us all with a weekly set of daily 
mantras to help us each carry on with integrity akin to the late 
Professor’s unflinching ways. 
 
 
78. See supra note *. 
